The advantage of this method is that messages sent through feedback forms are whitelisted. This technique improve the odds that your message will be read. Mailing is done in the same way as you received this message. Your message will be open by millions of site administrators and those who have access to the sites! Discounts are valid until June Feedback and warranty! Candidates who have passed the U. NET or M. Registration for Ph. Course work shall be applicable as per University policy. Choose the Ph. Give Ph. After the pre registration is done the candidate has to submit the proposal within the period of 3 months from the date of pre registration.
Collect the form for topic approval from the accounts dept. Fill the form and submit it to the thesis section along with other documents and 15 copies of the research proposal. Please note that Research proposals are accepted between Take challan from the office. Pay the registration fees in Allahabad bank approx Rs. With a copy of the fee receipt and letter of topic approval the candidate should go to the thesis section, Fort campus. They will give a date when the registration number could be given to the candidate. This can take around 2 months. However all those who need the registration number with days, should inform the thesis section.
They will give a challan of around Rs. On paying this amount in the accounts section, Fort Campus and submitting the receipt back to Thesis section, an earlier date will be given, on which the registration number would be ready. The registration number would be sent to the department office or the candidate can collect it at the thesis section on the given date. This programme shall emphasize upon basic communicative competence in German writing, speaking and listening skills shall be activated. Reading, hearing, understanding and writing skills shall be developed.
Along with the practice of German language structures, their application in authentic situations shall also be dealt with.
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Certificate of having cleared the 10 th Standard Examination recognised by this University. Tuition fees: Rs. External candidates may appear for this exam by paying Rs. Its aim will be to strengthen the structural knowledge of German, develop writing and speaking skills and to lead the students to the use of higher level of German language and comprehension of difficult texts.
Appropriate comprehension and structural exercises shall be given to facilitate the interpretation of German texts. Culture specific problems of understanding literature shall be discussed. Clearing the F. The main aim of this programme is to introduce the students to elementary knowledge of the language, its grammar and phonetics and shall involve diverse grammar exercises for practice. This programme shall emphasize upon basic communicative competence in German: writing, speaking and listening skills shall be activated, reading, hearing, understanding and writing skills shall be developed.
Certificate of having cleared the 10th Standard Examination recognised by this University. Mumbai being one of the most important economic, scientific and cosmopolitan cities of India, there is a significant demand for translation courses in science, technology, business and tourism. Thus this programme deals with the theoretical and practical aspects and techniques in translating passages from German to English and vice versa.
There will be 3 papers, a viva voce and project work. This programme is an intensive programme offered only to groups of a particular firm or institution, provided there are minimum 15 candidates. The main aim of this programme is to introduce elementary knowledge of the language, its grammar and phonetics. This programme is structured to introduce basic German vocabulary, phrases and day to day conversational skills. Certificate of having cleared the 10 th standard examination recognised by this University. This programme shall emphasize communicative competence in Marathi listening, reading, speaking, writing and understanding skills.
It makes the participant competent in understanding and using familiar, everyday expressions and very simple sentences, which relate to concrete needs. Proficiency in script, elementary language structures and basic communication skills. Students seeking admission to this programme should have passed S. Written Exam: marks. External Candidates with equivalent prerequisite competence shall be permitted to appear for the Certificate in Communicative Marathi Level 1 by paying a fees of Rs.
The programme shall enable the learners to understand and communicate with sentences and frequently used expressions related to areas of common immediate relevance, for instance basic personal, family information, shopping, local cultural space and employment. Communication skills of speaking, writing, reading, hearing and understanding for simple and routine tasks and situations shall be imparted. The learners shall be able to express themselves, describe and exchange information on familiar and routine matters, describe their background, immediate environment and matters in areas of immediate need in simple language.
External Candidates with equivalent prerequisite competence shall be permitted to appear for the Diploma in Communicative Marathi Level 2 by paying a fees of Rs. The basic aim of this programme is to introduce the students to the elementary knowledge of the language, its grammar, phonetics and the three different scripts. Registration: Rs. The Diploma Programme will be dealing with advanced level grammar.
Its aim will be to strengthen the structural knowledge of Japanese, develop writing and speaking skills and to lead the students to the use of higher level of Japanese language and comprehension of difficult texts. The Advanced Diploma Programme will further strengthen the structural knowledge of Japanese, develop writing and speaking skills and to lead the students to the use of higher level of Japanese language and comprehension of difficult texts.
There will be two papers. Writing business emails and letters, telephone etiquette, preparing for visits, making presentations. To improve the speaking skills this programme will seek to enable the learner to survive in Japan or to communicate fluently. The entrance test consisting of 2 papers as under shall be administered. For students other than Mumbai Board Applicable for all full time and part time programmes. For the attention of those students who are not graduates of the University of Mumbai or have not passed.
Candidates who are not graduates of the University of Mumbai or those who have not passed the S. Application for eligibility certificate must be accompanied by the Original Certificate and Mark Sheet from the Institution from where the candidate has graduated. The Registrar may issue a Provisional Statement of eligibility if he is satisfied that the applicant is prima facie eligible for admission to this University.
Candidates who join the programmes on the basis of a provisional statement of eligibility issued to them by the University during the academic year shall be required to pay Rs. Candidates will have to produce the Eligibility Certificate along with their application form at the time of admission in the Department. Research forms an integral part of the activities of the Department.
Introduction to research methodology as well as a dissertation are part of the M. German curriculum. Besides, research can be pursued at the department leading to M. Research done at the Department is aided by a Departmental Library as well as computer facility. The Department also organizes seminars, workshops and conferences on various topics of interest.
The Department also invites distinguished national and international scholars as Visiting Professors. In the offing are technical translation projects with a private German firm and technical translation project with BARC. The Ph. Iqbals Begegnung mit der deutschen Kultur-eine interkulturelle Studie Iqbals encounter with German culture- an intercultural study.
Die Wahrnehmung des Eigenen und des Fremden in G.
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Kakkanadans Roman Kaveriyude Vili. Eine interkulturelle Studie. Interkulturelle Vermittlung deutscher Kurzgeschichten der Nachkriegszeit in der indischen Germanistik. Die Kulturpoesie des Zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatismus: Studentenbewegung in indischen und deutschen Filmen im Eine vergleichende Studie. He Wentian and fellow Ph. Interdisciplinary Teaching Modules: Humanities in Dialogue. Critical Review of Teaching Material for Level 1.
The righteous man does not revolt out of selfishness. For Suzuki the sword fulfils a double function. Second, it is the annihilation of everything that stands in the way of peace, progress and humanity. It is well known in German culture too, especially in Nazism. In Neues Deutschland. Most of the religious parts of the book use words and phrases taken from the language of Christian piety albeit without reference to Christ, Mother Mary, the Trinity and other theological features i. There he is carried by the Great Force and from there he carries and overcomes everything.
When things become really bad and unrest threatens even his heart, then he turns inward and locks himself up in the innermost space of his soul. This space is his secret. There he recollects himself in his deepest centre. Totally silent he settles himself, lifts his heart and lets his mind and senses calm down again in God. Even in the middle of the greatest turmoil he always finds the moment to let go of everything, to lower the shoulders and breath deeply. And he does not stop this until he experiences the power of the great centre again.
If I reflect upon the ruling classes of the future, well, I think, they will perhaps revolve around something like a political, i. He did do so not as a secularized non-believer but as someone for whom the German and Japanese Volk had religious significance because he understood them and their political systems as manifestations of the Divine. When the state represents the Volk and the Volk is the highest revelation of ultimate reality then religious organisations become superfluous. Political rituals and state holidays take the place of religious rituals and feasts. He probably envisioned adding spiritual exercises based on the model of Japanese Zen arts to these quasi-religious forms of expression of the holy Volksgeist — at least for the German elites.
He holds a Ph. Campbell, Colin. Cancik, Hubert ed. Deeg, Max. Deutsches Nonnenleben. Recht Verlag, Festschrift zum Geburtstage Felix Kruegers. Neues Deutschland. Zweite, verbess. Tokyo: Sanshusha, The Japanese Cult of Tranquility. Wunderbare Katze und andere Zen-Texte. Weilheim: O. Barth Verlag, Erlebnis und Wandlung. Grundfragen der Selbstfindung.
Mein Weg zur Mitte. Der Weg ist das Ziel. Eckprecht, Karl pseud. Vom rechten Mann. Berlin: Herbert Stubenrauch Verlagsbuchhandlung, Glaube, Konfession und Religion im Nationalsozialismus. Gerstner, Alexandra: Neuer Adel. Aristokratische Elitekonzeptionen zwischen Jahrhundertwende und Nationalsozialismus. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, The Occult Roots of Nazism.
Wellingborough: The Aquarian Press, Hansen, H. Sinzheim: H.
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Frietsch Verlag, , pp. Harrington, Anne. Reenchanted Science. Herrigel, Eugen. Hippius, Maria. Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Ignatius von Loyola. Recht, Hermann Bohner. Erster Band. Junginger, Horst. Eine Beziehungs- und Konfliktgeschichte. Muller, Jeremy Z. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Puschner, Uwe.
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Rollett, Brigitte. Scherer, Eckart. Berlin et al. Schnurbein, Stefanie von ed. Sedgwick, Mark. Against the Modern World. Oxford Kyoto: Eastern Buddhist Society, Tilitzki, Christian. Wachutka, Michael. Wehr, Gerhard. Leben im Zeichen der Wandlung. Weinhandl:, Ferdinand. Recht Verlag, , pp. Meister Eckehart im Quellpunkt seiner Lehre. Erfurt: Verlag Kurt Stenger, Weinhandl, Margarete. Der innere Tag. Ein Handbuch zum Forschen in der Schrift. Stuttgart: Verlag J.
Japanische Schriftzeichen als Tattoo-Designs
Steinkopf, Worm, Herbert. It is similar to the attainment of a research doctorate, but on a higher level of scholarship. The candidate has to write and defend a thesis that is reviewed by an academic committee. Clay is molded into a vessel and on that which is non-existent on its hollowness depends the vessel's utility. By cutting out doors and windows we build a house and on that which is non-existent on the empty space within depends the house's utility.
Therefore, existence renders actual but non-existence renders useful. It was at the same time widespread among socialists. Within the Third Reich, Weinhandl acted as a dedicated follower of the Regime, who supported it not only through his philosophy but also with his participation in the burning of books at the central square in Kiel in and by his work in several compliant academic organisations. Shortly before the end of the Regime, it is quite likely that tensions between him and the NSDAP arose, perhaps because of his religious commitment and interest in spiritual renewal.
Italics, Weinhandl. Harrington: Reenchanted Science. But from his holistic perspective the creativity and responsibility of individuals are only legitimate insofar they enhance the fulfilment of the requirements of the greater whole. See e. Deutscher Geist , pp. Brackets and the words in brackets are part of the original text. In Nazi German the term Rassenfrage, racial question, referred to all the problems that arise as a result of the cohabitation of the Aryan race with alien races, and especially the Jews. Deutscher Geist , p.
Deutscher Geist. The Japanese publications: Maisuteru Ekkuharuto. Doitsuteki Shinko no Honshitsu Meister Eckhart. Global Philosophical Considerations. Tokyo: Rokumeikan, More about Yamato-damashii in Section II of this article. Hitler, Mein Kampf , p. The U. Defense Department planning for Guam is closely bound up with changing plans for basing in Okinawa. The plan was contingent, however, on closing the dangerous Futenma Base and expanding an existing base at Henoko, an approach fiercely resisted by Okinawan people and politicians. Despite serious concerns raised by federal agencies, local leaders and the community, DOD issued its "Record of Decision" ROD in September without any significant changes in plans.
At the time, DOD officials stated publicly that the timeline for the ROD was driven by the goal of spending down funds appropriated by the U. After the issuance of the ROD, several other factors contributed to the delay of the proposed realignment. The non-profit organizations pointed out that, despite controlling approximately one-third of Guam, DOD had failed to consider a single alternative for building the firing range complex on existing DOD property. The lawsuit garnered wide local support, with many in the community viewing DOD's plans as an unnecessary land grab that targeted a sacred site.
This attitude was grounded in the history of land-taking on Guam, where the DOD had controlled approximately half of the island and had only slowly begun to return unused or "underutilized" property to its original landowners. Congress's demand that DOD identify and justify costs also slowed the proposed military build-up. Furthermore, the DOD's failure to provide Congress with its own master plan detailing the funds necessary to complete the transfer of Marines from Okinawa to Guam drew the attention of several U.
DOD agreed to evaluate all reasonable alternatives in the preparation of a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement "SEIS" , estimating that the process would take years to complete. The Joint Statement indicated that 9, Marines would be moved from Okinawa, 5, Marines moving to Guam and the remaining 4, "rotating" between Australia and Hawaii. Based on the changes in force structure, the scope of the SEIS, initiated to assess the location of the proposed firing range complex, was expanded to analyze new housing and basing options.
The GAO concluded that even these estimates were "not reliable. Wood estimated that, of this amount, the U. The MIRC authorized the use of land, sea, and air for various military training exercises. To provide some context, the geographical area covered by the MIRC is three 3 times larger than the state of California. The total area to be covered under this training complex would be , square nautical miles.
This plan would permanently displace the indigenous people of Pagan, who have been waiting for decades to be cleared by their local government to return home. While those following these studies closely have treated each proposal independently, presentations made at a closed-door "roundtable" meeting hosted by military lobbyists on Guam gave a glimpse of DOD's long-term objectives in the region. In September , GUASA invited several defense experts to Guam to discuss the continued militarization of the region and, specifically, expanding the role of Guam and the Marianas. Amphibious assault training exercises were a major topic of discussion.
One presenter pointed out that, in light of the threat of conflict surrounding the South China Sea and the Senkaku Diaoyutai Islands, the Marine Corps was now the "force of choice" because of its amphibious capabilities. The plans for the Mariana Islands, and in particular the plans to take control over Pagan, would center on the ability to conduct joint military amphibious assault training exercises with countries allied with the U.
The threat of conflicts over island areas has also been used to push for the deployment of Osprey to Okinawa as well as Guam. This line of thought is at odds with statements made by former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, who pointed out that "advances in anti-ship systems keep pushing the potential launch point from shore.
Logic notwithstanding, the overarching goal of the GUASA conference appears to be the preparation of a "white paper" justifying an increase in military presence on Guam and the region. GUASA is hopeful that the return on investment for this "white paper" will be greater than the hundreds of thousands of dollars they have paid to Washington D.
On a visit to Makua Valley in Hawai'i, Kyle Kajihiro told me the legend of a villainous shape shifter who would change shape from man to shark in order to lure his prey. The Guam realignment is an example of how the number of Marines and dependents moving from Okinawa can be cut down by three-fourths, while the overall price tag increases. DOD will be bird, frog, shark — whatever it takes to secure defense appropriations. His research and work are focused on social and domestic issues. This road was included during the April negotiations on cost-sharing as a way to increase the overall cost estimate i.
Perhaps this is an attempt to redirect attention from the initial purpose of "reducing the burden on the Okinawan people" to more recent talk of forces being "geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable. President Xi Jinping's call for a "new type of great-power relationship" in meetings in with President Obama raises important questions about the future of US-China relations. On the surface, it appeared that the two leaders were on the same page.
At the June summit, Obama agreed with Xi that "working together cooperatively" and bringing US-China relations "to a new level" were sound ideas. Petersburg in September, Obama said of Xi's proposed new model: "we agreed to continue to build a new model of great power relations based on practical cooperation and constructively managing our differences.
Obama thus endorsed a "new type" of relationship in theory but seemed to want practical results before actually embracing it. Exactly why a new type of relations remains elusive, despite the multitude of contacts and interdependencies between China and the United States, and despite the fact that most Chinese and American analysts believe in the central importance of their relations, comes down to mistrust. But first: What do China's leaders mean by a "new type of great-power relationship" with the United States? One prominent Chinese observer, Zhang Tuosheng, has written that a key characteristic should be that it "break[s] the historical cycle in which the rise and fall of great powers inevitably leads to antagonism and war," instead relying on "equality and mutual benefit, and active cooperation.
Its significance today is that the Chinese are not content to be a junior partner of the United States; they believe they have arrived as a great power and want to be treated accordingly. They don't want "G-2"-co-dominion with the United States over world affairs. But the Chinese do demand consultation and coordination: C-2, as the former Chinese state councilor, Dai Bingguo, put it. There are a least five obstacles to C One is differing notions of international responsibility. In Robert Zoellick, then a deputy secretary of state in the George W. Bush administration, proposed that China become a "responsible stakeholder" fuzeren de liyi xiangguanzhe in the international system.
Zoellick hoped to attract Chinese leaders with the idea that the United States valued China as a partner in international affairs. But the reception was lukewarm, as a number of Chinese analysts decided that what Zoellick really meant by "responsible stakeholder" was that China should support the US position on key international issues such as North Korea's nuclear weapons, Iran's nuclear plans, and global finance. US policymakers today still use that expression when trying to push China in the US direction, as when Obama remarked at St. Petersburg that China's rise must be peaceful.
Chinese leaders and foreign-policy specialists prefer to refer to their country as a "responsible great power. They ask how the United States can speak of global responsibility in light of its unilateral interventions in the Middle East and Central Asia, its hard line on negotiating with North Korea and until recently Iran, its failure to put its financial house in order, and in response to US accusations of computer hacking spying on China and many others.
The Americans ask how China can speak of being a "responsible great power" when it acts aggressively in support of its territorial interests in the South China Sea and Sea of Japan, and when it rejects strong sanctions to deal with North Korea's and Iran's nuclear-weapon ambitions. On many other international issues, such as global warming and energy, the two countries similarly have widely divergent ideas about what responsibility means. Unless and until the United States and China reach agreement on what it means to be a globally responsible great power, it is hard to imagine that a "new type" of US-China relationship can evolve.
A second major stumbling block to creating a "new type of great-power relationship," and perhaps the most important one, is the different self-conceptions of China and the United States. As a rapidly rising power and a "big country," China not only expects to be consulted on all major international questions. It also expects to have a major, if not preeminent, role in its relations with neighboring countries. It wants to reform the system, not subvert it. More to the point, they see the United States as the chief obstacle to China's rise-and as taking actions aimed at "complicating its security environment.
The United States, on the other hand, claims exceptional status in the international community. Its leaders see the country as having universal values everyone should want and, as head of the "Free World," being custodian of freedom and democracy. Unlike China, the United States believes it has the right and responsibility to speak its mind about every country's internal political affairs.
Whereas Chinese leaders give priority to rapid development and preserving internal order, US leaders focus on remaining "number one" in world affairs and maintaining the capability to deploy military power all over the globe. US leaders voice suspicion about China's international ambitions and demand greater transparency on China's military spending and weapons programs. And while applauding China's rapid economic growth, US political and some business leaders argue as they did over the trade gap with Japan in the s that it is often based on unfair government policies.
A third obstacle is the legacy of the Cold War. Chinese analysts frequently refer to US "cold-war thinking" as a basic hindrance to better relations. Zhang Tuosheng, like many other Chinese analysts, points out that the idea of a new relationship emerged out of a good deal of rethinking among Chinese specialists about the post-Cold War order-the new "international pattern" guoji geju. He observes that the Chinese no longer accept a one-superpower world, even though accepting that the United States is still the most powerful country.
They emphasize the multipolar, multidimensional character of the contemporary era and seek a "harmonious world," which requires a "win-win" perspective above all in defining the China-US relationship. But neither side can claim to have overcome Cold War thinking. Cyber war and computer hacking, Taiwan's status, naval confrontations, and territorial disputes have all been handled much as they were during the Cold War-with self-justifications, accusations, and occasional shows of force rather than serious negotiations or recourse to international adjudication.
Many Chinese analyses refer to realist power transition theory to express concern about a confrontation between a rising power and a dominant power. Yet neither country has suggested creating a high-level body, above the level of bilateral dialogue groups, that might adopt new rules of conflict prevention in an effort to avoid a Cold War-style confrontation. Actually, the United States and China should have reason for some optimism in this regard, given the ninety or so official bilateral Track I forums at which they regularly meet, their extensive commercial and financial ties, and their numerous people-to-people and NGO contacts.
But finding common ground remains elusive in large part because the ideological dimension of US-China relations contains important Cold War elements. The US side does not accept parity with China any more than it accepted parity with the Soviet Union. Nor are US leaders strong believers in a multipolar world.
Meantime, in China, Mao-era notions of "struggle against US imperialism and hegemonism" survive. Fourth, there remain a number of problematic communication issues between the two countries. Defining international "responsibility" has already been mentioned. Chinese notions of sovereignty, particularly on the high seas, are challenged by US notions of "freedom of the seas. Media reports of the other's politics and foreign policy views are often distorted.
Journalists working in China have to be careful about what they say if they want a visa for their next visit, 8 just as Chinese news outlets and journalists have to weigh conformity with the unwritten rules of criticism or face silencing by the great Chinese firewall. Confucius Institutes in the United States, part of Chinese efforts to enhance their soft power, have sometimes been attacked by US academics as propaganda platforms. The fifth obstacle in US-China relations is the military imbalance. Although some US analysts see China as catching up with the United States in military capability, the fact is that by nearly every indicator of military power, the United States has a huge lead over China.
Angeletics Work in Progress
Whether we are talking about military spending several times China's , nuclear and conventional weapons, air and naval capability and technology, allies and overseas bases, or deployments actual and potential , there is simply no comparing the two countries. And while it might be said that China's substantial year-to-year increases in military spending will eventually yield a military equal or superior to that of the United States, such a prediction neglects two facts: the United States will not be standing still while China modernizes its military, regardless of US budget woes; and Chinese leaders are determined not to follow the Soviet Union's destructive path of trying to match US military budgeting or weapons.
China has demonstrated that it is a formidable regional military power, particularly when it comes to contingencies that involve Taiwan and Japan. But when its leaders protest US containment of China, they are acknowledging that China once again is ringed by a huge array of US firepower and basing options that put it at a great strategic disadvantage in the event of an armed conflict with the US and its allies. Thus, talk of a "new type of great-power relationship" is premature.
As far as I know, Xi Jinping's idea has not generated serious official interest in the US government. US policy toward China remains a combination of competition, cooperation, and containment or constrainment , unchanged from previous recent US administrations and more laden with mistrust than before. For US leaders to accept President Xi's invitation would mean in their view conceding comparable status and influence to China-a remarkable concession, one that would be politically very risky.
These days, no US political leader would contemplate sharing leadership with China, since that would be tantamount to acknowledging that the era of US leadership in Asia, the Pacific, and worldwide was over. Chinese analysts surely understand that, for they know that no Chinese leader could survive if he argued that China should abide by US notions of "responsible stakeholder.
Nevertheless, President Xi's idea may start a useful dialogue with the United States and others about alternatives to a world dominated by a single hegemon. As the United States faces numerous domestic problems, starting with an increasingly dysfunctional political system and seemingly endless military involvements in the Middle East and Central Asia, it may have to give serious thought to the idea of a strategic partnership with China on issues of vital mutual importance. Contrary to the view of some political scientists, the world does not have to rely on a hegemonic power to operate peacefully and productively.
Leadership can, and should, be a shared responsibility. So far as Asia is concerned, that means a US-China relationship that is cooperative and mutually respectful-C-2, in short. The benefits of US-China cooperation should be self-evident-for example, in the demilitarization and exploration of space, international financial stability, environmental protection, peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, and prevention of cyberattacks. US cooperation with China will not be possible on all issues, and may even be undesirable in a few instances. The "war on terror" was an example of misplaced and exaggerated common interest that lent justification to China's crackdown on ethnic "separatists.
But as we witness more frequent national and regional crises that have global implications and major human consequences-the Chernobyl nuclear plant meltdown of , the Asian financial crisis of , Southeast Asia's tsunami in , the US financial crisis of , Japan's nuclear plant disasters of , mass hunger and civil wars in developing countries, and uncontrollable global warming-we come to understand the imperative of a cooperative approach to real security. Asian countries would be among the greatest beneficiaries of a system in which they were not squeezed by two competing giants as happened during the Cold War.
And a cooperative US-China relationship would have one more crucial payoff: the opportunity for both countries to shift attention and resources away from each other and into environmental challenges and support for impoverished, crisis-prone areas of the world. The United States cannot afford to be on a negative trajectory with China, and the reverse is equally if not more true. Seeking or being reasonably perceived as seeking to contain China, and pretending that US or Western superiority will endure indefinitely, are not sound ideas in a world that is increasingly integrated economically and ecologically, and in which China is playing ever larger geopolitical and economic roles.
Nor will worrying about the "China challenge" improve the US economic or political situation-no more than will China's worrying about "US hegemony" solve China's internal problems. The United States needs to take care of its own affairs, with a sense of purpose that springs from its professed values and enormous material advantages. Let China's people and leaders worry about their country's domestic affairs. They do; and they have plenty to worry about: official corruption, income inequality, an aging population, and serious water, air and other environmental problems, to name just a few.
The history of US-China relations shows that when they are positive and win-win, the consequences for regional security in Northeast Asia are likewise positive. When, on the other hand, those relations are marked by tension and competitive tit-for-tat actions, regional security in Northeast Asia suffers. Take the matter of security and stability on the Korean peninsula. A cooperative US-China relationship, marked by regular military and civilian engagement, can go a long way toward promoting improved inter-Korean communication, laying the basis for productive multiparty dialogue on security issues whether a resumption of the Six Party Talks or a successor group, as discussed below , and minimizing dangerous miscalculations from occurring in the wake of a sudden crisis such as North Korea's collapse.
The news in late September , following the Obama-Xi meeting at St. Petersburg, that China has compiled a long list of equipment and materials that will not be allowed to be shipped to North Korea because of their potential use in weapons of mass destruction is an example of what can happen when high-level US-China dialogue takes place. Thus we ask: What steps can be taken by the United States and China to reduce tensions, promote trust, and widen the basis for cooperation? First, US military planning should change. The budget-driven reductions in US military spending, certain weapons acquisitions, and manpower that began in will be positive under at least four conditions relevant to Asia and to China in particular.
The reductions must be accompanied by a change in US forward-deployment of forces and extended nuclear deterrence. They must eliminate or significantly cut back redundant weapons systems, nuclear as well as conventional. The United States-and Japan-must resist calls for Japan to become a more active security partner in response to China's rise, 11 for as the dispute over air defense zones shows, a US-China clash stemming from US security commitments to Japan is an ever-present possibility.
Those force reductions must affect missions too, i. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton set the right tone when she said at a US-China dialogue meeting in that "no global player can afford to treat geopolitics as a zero-sum game" and that "if China's rising capabilities means that we have an increasingly able and engaged partner in solving the threats we face to both regional and global security, that is all good.
Unfortunately, none of the four conditions seems likely to be met. US military doctrine remains wedded to "full-spectrum capabilities," "military superiority," and the ability to defeat "more than one enemy" at a time. To the contrary, as two former Australian prime ministers have argued, the Obama administration's emphasis on military strength in Asia needlessly risks alienating Beijing and does not serve their country's interests.
China, on the other hand, has also taken actions that reduce confidence in its proclamations of a "harmonious world" and a "peaceful rise. China's assertiveness also invites precisely the response it wants to avoid, namely, an increased US military commitment to Asian allies-the Philippines and Japan in particular. Active patrolling of disputed waters also raises questions of trust in Southeast Asia inasmuch as China has supported codes of conduct that promise nonuse of force. The continuing emphasis by both China and the United States on military power in support of diplomacy suggests the need to go beyond bilateral forums when seeking to build confidence.
Direct, regular channels of communication between top-level officials below the presidents need to be established, especially between military leaders. Beijing and Washington might do better to focus on the SDM idea, since that would create a permanent institution devoted to many other regional security issues, including environmental and territorial disputes-issues that are more amenable to resolution than denuclearization, and might produce enough trust to eventually reach a verifiable agreement on it.
The SDM would have the authority to convene on the call of any member. It would be "an early warning and crisis management system," as the Chinese specialist said. His comment suggests a larger point: as China becomes increasingly comfortable working within multilateral groups, US diplomacy with China might profit from doing the same in order to arrive at a common position on regional security issues. Third, a US-PRC code of conduct that prevents the kinds of dangerous confrontations that have occurred at sea and in the air, most recently the December near-collision between US and PRC ships, would be enormously beneficial.
Reducing and redeploying US forces involved in close surveillance of the China coast around Hainan would be an essential element of any such negotiation. The good news here is that direct China-US military dialogue has a history. But that dialogue has been irregular, subject to disruption whenever US-China disputes become ugly. It remains to be seen whether or not "rules of the road" can be agreed upon to prevent serious disputes. People often ask whether or not this century will belong to China or the United States.
Department of German
This is really the wrong question. The right one is, How could world leaders go about creating a legitimate and effective framework for cooperative security, one that lays the groundwork for addressing the most serious human security problems? For the United States, China, and the other countries with regional and global reach, the answer must include practicing new forms of leadership, deepening cooperation with each other, and embracing common security as the touchstone of national security.
They must recognize that the greatest security challenges of our time are poverty-and violence in response to poverty-and destruction of the environment, and that these challenges can only be effectively met by making them a common priority. Military buildups and resort to force or threat are irrelevant to such problems, or may exacerbate them; indeed, they are the primary contributors to mistrust and miscalculations. If China and the United States can find common ground on cooperative security, both can truly lay claim to being responsible great powers.
A Skeptic's View Lynne Rienner, Thornton China Center Report No. See also David Shambaugh, ed. Dai Bingguo is quoted by Wu p. But he insists that such thinking poses a more serious problem in the US. Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, "China Pressures U. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, " The U.