La raison selon Giambattista Vico. Mais si Vico mena cette entreprise critique, ce ne fut pas, comme la. Plus Vico remontait loin vers les racines de l'homme antique, plus il fondait la dimension intelligible du savoir. Associer les lois de l'intellect et les lois de la vie. C'est ici la limite". Quel humanisme? En proposant une "critique mythologique cle la raison" p. La gemination est ici la scission originale entre raison et mythe, concept et image. L'infini devient alors "commencement absolu" p. Ni le nominalisme comme tel ni l'ontologie de l'individuel n'ont leur place ici" p.
Il ne s'agit pas d'une. Kant, in Raison ardente n. New York, I. Press, , New York, Monthly Review Press. AMIN, Samir, ed. Halae Magdeb. Martin-Luther Univ. Halle-Wittenberg, , p. AMO Antoine-Guillaume , ? Paris, Nathan, , Larose, , p. Bloomington, Indiana-Univ-Pr. Washington, Three Continent Press, Lexington-Books, New York, Leiden 2 , Mvumbi Ngolu Tsasa.
North Scale Institute Publishing Company, , illus. New York, Free Press, , Tananarive, Imp. Esquisse historique et descriptive. Tshiamalenga Ntumba. Etude analytique et critique. Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, , p. Paris, Dessain et Tours. Roma, Il pensiero scientifico, , Leipzig, Koehler and Amelang, Washington, D. Rome, Cath. Book Agency, , Rome, Catholic Book Agency, , New York, Exposition Press, Philosophy and anthropology, 2.
Gent Belgium. Story-Scientia, , p.
TEXTE - Le discours d'Emmanuel Macron au Congrès de Versailles
Anthony, Inventing an African Practice in Philosophy. African-American Philosophy? New York, Oxford Univ. Press, , XIII, p. African Theology en Route. Maryknoll, Orbis Book, A propos de "La philosophie bantoue" du R. Reconsidering Inventions of Africa, in Critical Inquiry 19 1 , Romae, Pont. Seminar Paper S. London, Tavistock, , Bloomington, Indiana University Press, , Nairobi, Konrad Adenauer Foudation, - , xx - xxiii. Berkeley, University of California Press, Cambridge, Mass. Unpublished Ph. London, Oxford Univ. Press, 2nd ed. Prefazione di Dom Diovanni Rosdsiu. Assisi, Pro Civitate Cristiana,, p.
Paris, Fondation Dappere, , p. London, Ithaca Press, Philadelphia Pa. Actes du 1er week-end moral des intellectuels catholiques de Matadi. Paris, Fayard, , p. Dakar, Ed. Africaines, 2. Une reprise psychanalytique de Ludwig Feuerbach.
Ngimbi Nseka. Abidjan, Impr. Reprotechnique, , p. Association ivoirienne des professeurs de philosophie AIPP.
Kampala, Makerere University Press, , vol. Mbiti, in Cahiers des Religions Africaines 5 n. Africaines, 7. Kinshasa, , Bonn, Steyler Verlag, , Bonn, Steyler verlag, Kampala, Makerere Univ. Press, vol. Bloomington, Indiana-Univ Pr. Actes de la 7e sem. Africaines 9. New York, Cambridge Univ. AUGE, M.
Aïe Aïe Aïe !
Paris 5,3 , Paris, Maspero, Paris, Hermann, , p. Kant inconsistently combines his interest in a transcendental analysis of knowledge through an abstract view of the subject with an interest in real human being. In the critical philosophy, the idea that the subject produces what it knows as a necessary condition of knowledge clearly has, but is just as clearly not meant to have, an anthropological ring. Kant rigorously isolates epistemological and anthropological elements within his position.
Although his theory of pure It is unsatisfactory to claim that the subject is necessarily active unless one also elucidates the nature of this activity. The post-Kantian evolution of the idea of the subject can be understood as a series of reactions to the Kantian view. In the simplest terms, in German idealism after Kant, there is a gradual move away from the idea of the subject as an abstract epistemological placeholder, a mere principle assumed for purposes of knowledge, toward a rival view of the subject as a human being rooted in the social, political and historical world.
In postKantian German idealism, the main views of subjectivity all exhibit a tension between the abstract view of the subject as active that Kant proposes and the concrete view of the human being as the real subject toward which his theory implicitly refers. These aspects, in principle separable, are in practice intertwined within all later German idealist positions.
Later forms of German idealism invariably emphasize either one or another of these aspects of his view Fichte, Marx , or both at once Hegel. The post-Kantian moment in German idealism offers a complex discussion turning on the relation of the finite and the infinite, or absolute views of knowledge and subjectivity. Schelling, who understood the finite subject through the infinite, or absolute, differs as a special case from other major German idealists in that regard.
Yet such a classification would finally be inaccurate since each of the views combines finite and infinite dimensions, or an understanding of the subject as both a real human being rooted in the real world and an abstract epistemological principle. The difference between them, then, is a matter of degree, or emphasis.
For in each case, the German idealists, including Marx, offer dualistic appreciations of human being as a finite, concrete, human subject as well as an infinite, abstract view of subjectivity. Most important philosophers are misunderstood, but Fichte more than most. A grasp of his theory is not helped by his hermetic style or his exaggerated claims, rebuffed by Kant, to be the only correct interpreter of the critical philosophy. First, he insists on a conception of the subject, in his language the self das Ich , as active.
Kant analyzes types of knowledge and experience through types of activity, but he is unable to think the conception of a unified subject other than in the abstract sense of a transcendental unity of apperception. Fichte begins, then, with the result toward which Kant points in the critical philosophy but cannot attain. For Hegel, the absolute is a result that only fully is in the end.
Marx studies subjectivity on three interrelated, but different levels: in early writings, such as the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, through a concept of human being; in the German Ideology and elsewhere through the idea of class, a concept that he never really defines; The Marxist assertion that Marx advances beyond Hegel and philosophy in general to discover the real subject of human history in the concept of the proletariat46 presupposes a unified Marxian view of subjectivity that Marx in fact never formulates.
With the important exception of Husserl, later German idealism has continued the Kantian stress on the subject as active while making a slow transition away from the epistemological placeholder version of subjectivity advanced by Descartes and restated by Kant. Like Kant and Descartes, he sharply distinguishes the subject of knowledge from human being.
In the second edition of Ideas in , he introduces the phenomenological reduction that he continues to regard, in all his later writings, as the cornerstone of phenomenology. It is from the perspective of the latter that eidetic phenomenology is possible. Husserl wavers on the Kantian claim that knowledge is possible if and only if the subject produces its object.
Yet this neutral word, which is apparently never clearly defined, reflects his own inability to clarify this key aspect of his theory. For he held that transcendental phenomenology is the systematic analysis of the contents that constitute themselves in consciousness, of what is constituted in us; and he also held that the subject constitutes itself and its objects.
As his view of being changed, it required a change in the view of the subject through which the concern with being is raised. In Being and Time, Heidegger recasts Husserlian phenomenology, as he understands it, for his own ontological purposes. In Being and Time, he poses the question of the meaning of being,56 where being, or being in general, is distinguished from beings, or entities. Heidegger identifies phenomenology with ontology. This entity we denote by the term Dasein.
In Being and Time, Heidegger stresses the connection of Dasein with existence and being. According to Heidegger, Dasein is concerned with and understands being, at least in a preliminary way. But the entire treatise is devoted to an analysis of Dasein in two parts: the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein, and the later analysis of Dasein and temporality. Just as for Plato human being is the middle term between appearance and reality, so for Heidegger human being or Dasein is the link between beings and the comprehension of their being.
On the basis of his own anti-anthropologism,64 Husserl mistakenly thought that Heidegger had relapsed into basing a philosophy on anthropology. In thinking the subject through its Just as the Cartesian cogito scrutinizes the contents of consciousness in order to determine which ideas are clear and distinct, so Dasein discloses truth by wresting uncoveredness from entities. After the turning Kehre in his thought, at some point after the appearance of Being and Time in , perhaps as early as that year but in all probability after , Heidegger abandons his earlier effort to know being through Dasein in favor of a view of being as self-disclosing.
Kant had rejected bad metaphysics in order to ascertain the conditions of metaphysics as a science. Heidegger later came to believe that the effort to revive a genuine form of metaphysics was misguided. For Heidegger, the introduction of the cogito inevitably transforms philosophy into philosophical anthropology that can only be overcome by overcoming Western metaphysics. If being discloses itself, it is no longer necessary for human beings to disclose it.
Hyppolite developed a momentary interest in Heidegger after his views on Hegel had taken shape. His early work on Hegel is entirely exempt from any Heideggerian influence. He later wrote at least three articles on Heidegger. Hegel has little directly to say about death either in the Phenomenology or in other writings. He remarks that, with the possible exception of Marcel, French existentialism largely derives from phenomenology.
And he further points out that existentialism is not only due to the anthropological side of his position that Heidegger himself rejected. Conceptual movements are rarely uniform, or homogeneous, but structuralism is even more heterogeneous than most. Structuralism arose at a time when Heidegger was central to French philosophy. Piaget, who is typical of structuralists in that regard, is concerned to avoid a conception of the subject that has anything to do with lived experience. Although he indicates that Nietzsche is more important to him than is Heidegger—a Nietzsche read through Heideggerian lenses—he sees the latter as the essential philosopher.
Yet it is misconceived as an attack on human being as such, or as antihumanism, since it is limited to an analysis of the concept or the representation of human being. He objects to the very idea of social science as in principle mistaken. Social sciences are not only false sciences; they are not even sciences at all since they rely on a conception of human being that cannot be known, that cannot be the object of a science. This chapter will show how the revival of the French interest in humanism naturally led toward Heidegger. We shall see that many French philosophers turned to Heidegger in the mistaken belief that he shared their humanist concern.
There is a difference between the specifically philosophical concerns that dominate a given philosophical position, those that lead to its initial formulation and later reformulation, and those often quite different concerns, which may or may not be philosophical in nature, that lead to its rise to prominence in the discussion. Bolshevism so widely feared, and the rise of National Socialism, Heidegger was able to translate his technical ideas into language that expressed the contemporary Zeitgeist.
Examples include themes of authenticity, resoluteness, being with others, anxiety, and so on, all existential themes in a Germany struggling to preserve self-respect and to assert individuality in a difficult period between two world wars. It only finally happened when, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the problem of humanism was raised again in the French philosophical context. Philosophers have often rejected the association between philosophy and humanism on the grounds that humanism is incompatible with rigorous philosophical thought.
European humanism did not spring into being in a particular theory or in a particular text, but has emerged only gradually over a long period. A concern with humanism is already present in the Roman tradition. Cicero and Varro distinguish between humanitarianism, or the love of humanity in general, and humanism humanitas , understood in the sense of the Greek paideia, meaning education. The idea of human being is an idea that later spread throughout Europe, and that is often taken to mark the end of the Middle Ages.
Yet as the older view of classical studies did not disappear when the conception of human being emerged, this whole period is marked by a continual oscillation between the revival of the humanist tradition and the emergence of a philosophy of human being. Yet it omits a central philosophical element of humanism: the self-congratulatory, broadly humanist understanding of philosophy as indispensable for the good life. Discussion of humanism often tends to equate the genus with one of its species.
Understood as the revival of classical letters, humanism is the effort to develop the rational faculties without regard to discipline. Niethammer represented a so-called new humanism Neuhumanismus that aimed to provide a general development of human faculties through the study of the ancient world, in particular through the revival of classical letters.
This view of humanism, which can be illustrated in the writings of Pico della Mirandola and Ludovicus Vives, naturally ranges widely over such themes as freedom, naturalism, historical perspective, religion, and science. In a famous passage, Pico della Mirandola stresses the idea of human freedom: I have given you, Adam, neither a predetermined place nor a particular aspect nor any special prerogatives in order that you may take and possess these through your own decision and choice.
The limitations on the nature of other creatures are contained within my prescribed You shall determine your own nature without constraint from any barrier, by means of the freedom to whose power I have entrusted you. I have placed you at the center of the world so that from that point you might see better what is in the world. I have made you neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal so that, like a free and sovereign artificer, you might mold and fashion yourself into that form you yourself shall have chosen.
Foucault, for instance, usefully distinguishes between the Enlightenment as an event and humanism as the decision to focus on a theme or given set of themes. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they stand with any certainty. Here the Enlightenment stress on reason is Thinkers like the Danish writer Kierkegaard, who understand human being as authentic only through a particular relation to God, are an exception to this tendency.
Although Kant famously seeks to limit knowledge to make room for faith,23 his position throughout is rigorously secular. He continually stresses reason as the main, in fact the only admissible, component in his analyses of various types of experience. Even his discussion of reason is conducted within the bounds set by reason that, from his very rationalist viewpoint, cannot be rationally transgressed. A closely Kantian insistence on human being as rational and free is a main theme in later German idealism. Although Kant develops a theory of history in his minor writings, he is never able to integrate it into his view of reason, which remains resolutely ahistorical.
After Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff, modern German philosophy grows increasingly secular, as reflected in the importance of secular humanism. Philosophy itself can be regarded as broadly humanist in inspiration due to its claims for intrinsic social relevance. The latter idea has often met with resistance. Nonetheless, many philosophers support the broadly humanist view of the philosophical discipline as not only useful but essential for the good life initially formulated by Plato.
A broadly Platonic conception of the social utility of philosophy echoes through the modern philosophical tradition. The most varied aspects of French thought routinely lay claim to the humanist label. In other countries and literatures, the dissociation of the temporal and the eternal, the rational and the religious, is often incomplete.
Perhaps this separation has never been fully carried out. Philosophy and religion are strongly interrelated in the positions of later German idealists. In our own In France, where the tendency to dissociate reason and faith has been relatively weak, certainly weaker than in Germany, there is a permanent tension stretching over centuries between competing secular and religious conceptions of humanism. This tension can be regarded as an opposition on many levels between an understanding of the world centered on a view of human being, and a view of the world and of human being centered on a religious commitment, hence as a difference between essentially irreligious, or pagan,37 and religious, or antipagan conceptions of man.
In the French discussion, the antireligious thrust of secular humanism is often rejected from the point of view of religious humanism as a negation of human being and as anti-Christian. In a typical passage, Henri de Lubac writes: Positivistic humanism, Marxist humanism, Nietzschean humanism: much more than atheism in the strict sense, the negation of what is at the base of each of them is an antitheism, and more precisely an antiChristianism.
As opposed as they are to each other, their implications, hidden or manifest, are numerous, and although they share a foundation in their rejection of God, they also have the same consequences, above all the crushing of the human person. It has been claimed that the Enlightenment was only possible because at the time Christianity was moribund.
The French humanist tradition follows rather than precedes the Italian Renaissance. Philosophical humanism begins in France as early as Montaigne who, rather than Descartes, is sometimes regarded as the founder of modern philosophy. His work can be read from different perspectives: as a theory of knowledge, suggested by his concern with scepticism, or as a philosophy of life. In the Anglo-Saxon discussion, Descartes is mainly studied as the prototype of the modern epistemologist, as the founder of foundationalism,51 as the discoverer of a method to secure knowledge against scepticism.
Yet the French tradition, while preserving an epistemological emphasis, links it to a reading of the Cartesian theory as the basis of modern philosophical humanism, even as anticipating later existentialism. The secular strand of French humanism is already present in the Cartesian emphasis on the idea of progress that follows his stress on the supremacy of reason and the invariability of the laws of nature. Another method might be equally satisfactory, provided it did not put a cold, insensitive, silent being in the place of man.
For man is the unique starting point, and the end to which everything must finally be related if one wishes to please, to instruct, to move to sympathy, even in the most arid matters and in the driest details. Take away my own existence and that of my fellow men and what does the rest of nature signify. It was given a gigantic helping hand in the practical sphere by the French Revolution which sought to realize the famous ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity, as well as democracy and progress.
Taking a stance This tension is certainly not confined to the French context. It can be illustrated by two philosophers writing in reaction to Hegel: Ludwig Feuerbach and Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard, who insists on existence against Hegelian idealism, can be located, through his insistence on the religious dimension, within rightwing Hegelianism. Religious humanism takes the contrary view, expressed by Kierkegaard, that human salvation must be sought in the return to God. It is present, for instance, in the struggle between innovation and tradition, between those who favor the maintenance of a strong centralized state closely tied to the Roman Catholic Church and those who oppose it.
The same French Revolution that attempted to realize the social contract theory by proclaiming the rights of man before violating them in the terror that followed, abolished the privileges of the nobility and restricted the Church. The effort to found government on the will of the governed aimed at equality before the law against hierarchy and liberty against the traditionally divine right of kings. The predictable result was a tension that has lasted over more than two hundred years. It features irreconcilable views, opposing those who regard the French Revolution as a permanent contribution to the development of human freedom, bought at the price of loosening the ties between Church and state; and those who regard it as a betrayal of the human rights it invoked,65 a view represented ouside the French discussion by Edmund Burke.
Since that time, the problem has remained unresolved as France has continued to maintain a strong central state with centralized institutions. In practice, French political centralization has given rise to a resistance to central direction that occasionally verges on anarchism. Not surprisingly, anarchism is a political doctrine that has long been popular in France. It is, then, not surprising that the French student revolution has been regarded as merely a further attempt to gain autonomy, as The dispute between secular and religious humanists frequently concerns the proper attitude toward tradition.
Discours d’ouverture du colloque annuel des Écoles d’ingénieurs
Traditionalists like Heidegger or, following him, Gadamer frequently resist the effort to separate tradition from reason, bending their efforts to preserve tradition. On the contrary, Descartes and others like him regard the break with tradition as a necessary condition for the beginning of science, as a necessary prerequisite to the liberation of human being through reason and the domination of nature.
This complex tension is present on occasion in the thought of an individual writer, such as Pascal,73 a writer who, in that respect, is divided against himself. Pons has perceptively noted an unresolved conflict between Pascal the man of science and Pascal the believer. This is a tension between Pascal who accepts the Enlightenment idea of infinite progress, including the Baconian idea of the perfection of human being over time, and the same Pascal who deplores the illusion of human progress since, despite the apparent changes, human being remains inalterably the same.
For he rejects many usual humanist ideas, such as the ideas of progress Yet Heidegger does not break, but rather reforges, the philosophical link to humanism from the perspective of his concern with being. First, there was the worldwide economic collapse that affected the social and political structure throughout Europe, including France. Third, there was a lengthy French socialist tradition. Thinkers in this tradition have long been interested in the full development of the human individual. French socialism has long taken a variety of forms, including, after the Russian Revolution, the emergence of a powerful French Communist Party.
In France as in Germany and elsewhere, the concern to resist Bolshevism was a strong motivating factor in the turn toward rightwing theories, including conservative philosophical views. Fourth, there was the renewed attention to Hegel, including the emergence of a leftwing form of Hegelianism. Yet as will emerge in the discussion below, this same paragraph inconsistently leaves open the possibility of an anthropological misreading of his thought. Translations have always been particularly important for French philosophers.
Unlike Germans, who are often fluent in English, although less Except for the views of Wittgenstein and Frege, Anglo-American analytic thinkers are by and large uninterested in other cultures and tradition. French philosophy, as already noted, developed a deep interest in German thought early in the nineteenth century. At the present time, the French discussion of German thought has a strongly philological perspective. Yet until relatively recently, since the French philosophical command of German tended to lag well behind the interest in German philosophy, French philosophers were highly dependent on translations into French.
Heidegger inverts the familiar starting point in consciousness since human being is essentially its existence; and for Dasein to be is to understand being. Instead of the usual intellectual effort to achieve the unity of the subject, Heidegger describes the unity of human being within existence. The anthropological reading of Heidegger is further underscored in the French revival of Hegel studies.
Heidegger contends that through translation, through the transposition of thought from one language to another, it is inevitably transformed. In Being and Time, Heidegger distinguishes between the fundamental, or existential, structures of human existence that concern its existentiality, and the particular, or existentiell, ways in which human being exists. It pointed toward the conflation between the views of Heidegger and Sartre that the latter exploited immediately after the Second World War in his depiction of existentialism, in response to his critics, as a humanism. This led to the evident conflation that Heidegger had been at pains to anticipate in Being and Time between the subject of phenomenological ontology and the very different subject of the human sciences.
Precisely for this reason psychology must resign itself to missing human-reality, if at least this human-reality exists. In a book from the early s, he suggested that it is incorrect to regard Heidegger as a philosopher of existence. Yet he played a decisive role in helping to propagate it. Sartre, who followed Kant in stressing absolute freedom as absolute responsibility, acquired great intellectual fame, exceedingly rare for a philosopher, after the publication of Being and Nothingness in , in then occupied France, through his insistence that we are always utterly and irrevocably free to choose.
He maintains this view not only on the theoretical but also on the practical level. In a typical passage about the lot of the French during the German occupation, Sartre writes: Never have we been as free as during the German occupation. We had lost all our rights, beginning with the one of speaking; we were insulted everyday and we had to shut up; we were deported en masse, as workers, Jews, political prisoners; everywhere on walls, in newspapers, on the screen we found that bland and repulsive face which our oppressors wanted us to have of ourselves: because of all that we were free.
Since the Nazi venom snuck even into our thoughts, every correct thought was a conquest; since an all-powerful police tried to keep us silent, every word become precious like the weight of commitment…. With the exception of Merleau-Ponty, who was extremely critical of his existentialist colleague, Sartre has no major follower in later French philosophy. His early position is heavily indebted to the views of Husserl, Heidegger and Hegel, and his later thought is equally beholden to the theories of Marx and Marxism. And when I made the trip to Freiburg, I was still motivated by my curiosity about what could have made Being and Nothingness possible.
Heidegger stresses the links between his position and the pre-Socratics, whereas Heidegger scholars point to the influences deriving from his reading of texts by Aristotle, the neo-Kantians, and so on. Sartre viewed things rather differently. His main concern from beginning to end, including Sartre was not only interested in human being; he further desired to ground his philosophical theory in philosophical anthropology. We can illustrate this point through the ruminations of Sartre, the intellectual soldier in search of himself.
While others were engaged in fighting a war to the death with fascism, he was busy keeping a diary, writing plays, and preparing his philosophical magnum opus. Raising the problem of humanism in November , Sartre rejects the idea of human being as a species as no more than an abasement of human nature.
Certainly, it was urgent at the time of Descartes to define spirit through methods inherent to spirit itself. In that way it was isolated. And all the later efforts to constitute the whole man by adding something to spirit were destined to fail because they were only additions. For Heidegger, freedom is essentially a conservative notion whose authentic expression requires the repetition of the past in the future in order to conserve rather than to depart from tradition.
For Sartre, freedom entails a responsibility to choose and authentic choice accepts this responsibility. The idea that one can assume responsibility for oneself and everyone has always attracted two groups of equally unrealistic supporters: young people who are not yet enmeshed in such social relationships as commitments to spouses and children, and philosophers who typically consider philosophical thought as wholly independent. Early on, Sartre was aware of and annoyed by this dependence. Even in France, the wider public does not read philosophy, certainly not such technical philosophical treatises as Being and Nothingness.
Sartre had Heidegger focuses on human being in terms of the problem of being that was never a Sartrian concern. On the contrary, Sartre insists on political commitment conjoined to the choice, not only of oneself, but, distantly following Kant, of all human beings, for each of us is responsible for the whole world, so to speak. Heidegger is an anti-Cartesian whose rejection of Cartesianism deepens in his later thought, above all in his effort to decenter the subject.
Sartre begins as and finally remains a Cartesian whose effort to understand human being in situation, even in his Marxist phase, never abandons its Cartesian roots. French philosophy since the sixteenth century has been concerned with humanism understood as a philosophy of human being in a broad sense. The preceding chapter showed that and how the initial phase of the French Heidegger reception stressed an interpretation of Heidegger as a humanist thinker.
According to John Gerassi, a recent biographer, who devotes a whole chapter to the topic, no one was more hated than Sartre. Foucault, who was earlier a member of the French Communist Party, later turned against communism and Marxism as Sartre moved in that direction, eventually writing his Critique of Dialectical Reason. In this sense, Sartre is the last Hegelian and, I would even say, the last Marxist.
If the two main movements of French postwar thought are existentialism and structuralism, then it is a measure of the importance of the man and his continued influence on French philosophy that French existentialism is largely identified with his theory and that French structuralism can be understood as a concerted effort to throw off its shackles. In his first novel, Nausea, where he emphasizes the absurdity of life, he satirizes the humanist as the gay narrator who blindly loves man but hates individuals. He only turned explicitly to humanism in the aftermath of the war when a similar concern swept through France.
Marxism, especially as linked to the French Communist Party, was dominant in France over about a dozen years from until the the short-lived Hungarian Revolution and subsequent Soviet invasion in These were some of the many writers and intellectuals who either initially or later feared the link between Marxism and Bolshevism or Leninism. This point has a clear existential significance. Sartre begins his lecture on existentialism by reviewing some of the more salient objections to his philosophical theory. Medieval thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas, traditionally make existence dependent on essence.
Yet his lecture did not allay but only increased doubts about his theory. His silence with respect to the limitations to human freedom imposed by the social and political context was attacked as antihumanism by Jean Kanapa, his former Kanapa, who criticizes Sartre, not wholly unfairly, as an intellectual opportunist, regards existentialism as a covert form of anti-Marxism.
He opposes any form of Christian humanism in which human being is made to capitulate before God42 and argues that humanism is meaningful only as Marxism. Although the existentialists present themselves as revolutionaries, they are finally only an ineffectual bunch of bourgeois intellectuals. Lefebvre correctly regards Sartre as self-inflated. He begins his book with an interesting autobiographical account that usefully mentions many of the future intellectuals of his generation, in the process of explaining how he, who earlier adhered to existentialism, became a Marxist and a communist.
At the end of the war, there was a very broad range of attitudes toward Heidegger. His lecture failed to placate but only annoyed his philosophical critics.
Études juridiques comparatives et internationalisation du droit
Responses followed from the right and the left, from Christians and communists, from other existentialists and from their opponents. Etienne Gilson, the noted French Thomist, attempted to divide and conquer in claiming that Thomism is only existentialism properly understood. Gilson held that the initial premise of Sartrean existentialism, in his view the premise that human being is only what it does, is a purely gratuitous affirmation. Beaufret was not the only orthodox French Heideggerian in this period, but he was certainly the most visible and most orthodox of them all.
Only two years later in another article,66 he distanced himself from Sartre on behalf of Heidegger. It is also significant that the ongoing edition of his Collected Works will not include his letters, since the letters from his period as rector of the University of Freiburg could reasonably be expected to shed light on his precise relation to the NSDAP and his view of real Nazism.
Others in the French discussion take a much harder line. Paradoxically, although a long line of French intellectuals, including French philosophers, have been directly engaged on the political Suffice it to say that in , almost immediately after Hitler came to power Heidegger was elected rector of the University of Freiburg i. At the end of the war, like other Nazi collaborators in the German academy Heidegger was called to account for his actions. He immediately took steps directed at self-exculpation, or at least at damage control, that he and his some of his closest followers continued until the end of his life, and that his followers have still not abandoned.
At present, when France and Germany are together striving to live together in the framework of the Common Market, relations between the two continental neighbors are exceedingly good. It was something that was in the air at the time, for instance in the art historian A. Through such awareness each of the peoples is brought back to what is ownmost to it [je Eigene] and grasps it with increased clarity and resoluteness [Entschiedenheit].
The main feature [Grundzug] of its mission has been indicated for the historically cultured peoples in the present world situation [Weltstunde] as the rescue of the West [Rettung des Abendlandes]. Rescue here does not mean the simple maintenance of what is already present to hand [Vorhandenen], but rather signifies the originary, newly creating justification [Rechtfertigung] of its past and future history.